One world versus many: the inadequacy of Everettian accounts of
  evolution, probability, and scientific confirmation by Kent, Adrian
ar
X
iv
:0
90
5.
06
24
v3
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  4
 Ju
l 2
01
3
One world versus many: the inadequacy of Everettian accounts of evolution,
probability, and scientific confirmation
Adrian Kent∗
Centre for Quantum Computation, DAMTP, Centre for Mathematical Sciences,
University of Cambridge, Wilberforce Road, Cambridge CB3 0WA, U.K. and
Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, 31 Caroline Street North, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 2Y5
(Dated: July 22, 2013)
There is a compelling intellectual case for exploring whether purely unitary quantum theory
defines a sensible and scientifically adequate theory, as Everett originally proposed. Many different
and incompatible attempts to define a coherent Everettian quantum theory have been made over the
past fifty years. However, no known version of the theory (unadorned by extra ad hoc postulates)
can account for the appearance of probabilities and explain why the theory it was meant to replace,
Copenhagen quantum theory, appears to be confirmed, or more generally why our evolutionary
history appears to be Born-rule typical.
This article reviews some ingenious and interesting recent attempts in this direction by Wallace,
Greaves-Myrvold and others, and explains why they don’t work. An account of one-world ran-
domness, which appears scientifically satisfactory, and has no many-worlds analogue, is proposed.
A fundamental obstacle to confirming many-worlds theories is illustrated by considering some toy
many-worlds models. These models show that branch weights can exist without having any role
in either rational decision-making or theory confirmation, and also that the latter two roles are
logically separate.
Wallace’s proposed decision theoretic axioms for rational agents in a multiverse and claimed
derivation of the Born rule are examined. It is argued that Wallace’s strategy of axiomatizing a
mathematically precise decision theory within a fuzzy Everettian quasiclassical ontology is incoher-
ent. Moreover, Wallace’s axioms are not constitutive of rationality either in Everettian quantum
theory or in theories in which branchings and branch weights are precisely defined. In both cases,
there exist coherent rational strategies that violate some of the axioms.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Some common ground
Although I disagree with the Everettian contributors to this volume on some fundamental questions, I think they
deserve much credit for developing some creative and interesting ideas and arguments, which have certainly helped
advance our understanding of fundamental science. To elaborate on this, let me note some points on which I agree
with many Everettians.
First, the Everettian programme had a sensible motivation. Everett asked[1], in effect, whether quantum theory
really needs to be framed in such a way that the evolution of the wave function is governed by two different laws:
generic unitary evolution together with the projection postulate when measurement takes place. It’s a good question.
Even if, rather than the projection postulate, quantum theory came equipped with a precise extra dynamical law
implying the postulate as an approximation, it would be natural to ask if we really needed it. As it is, there is quite
a compelling case for exploring whether we can make sense of purely unitary quantum theory.
Second, it is a sensible project to try to extract a physical ontology from a unitarily evolving quantum state
vector, given a theory of the initial state or initial conditions, a Hilbert space defining a representation of position,
momentum and other canonical operators, and a dynamical theory that expresses the Hamiltonian in terms of these
operators. Whether the project succeeds in producing an ontology with the properties that Everettians fondly imagine
is another question – but certainly one worth discussing. One still, strangely, sometimes hears the argument that it is
illegitimate – a basic misunderstanding of quantum theory – even to examine the possibility of giving the state vector
a direct physical interpretation. This seems to me simply unimaginative dogma. Everettians are right to insist that
their programme should be judged on whether or not it works, not on whether it respects pre-Everettian quantum
orthodoxies.
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2Third, neither the apparently fantastic nature of the Everettian worldview, nor the superficial conflict between
postulating multiple independent mutually inaccessible worlds and Occam’s razor, are entirely compelling arguments
against the Everett programme. One needs to consider Everettian ideas in the context of other attempts to make
sense of quantum theory, and in detail. One of the great intellectual challenges of theoretical physics is to find a
mathematically elegant, universally applicable, Lorentz covariant, scientifically adequate version of quantum theory
that supplies a well-defined realist ontology. If the Everett programme really could produce a well-defined Lorentz
covariant physical ontology that adds little or no arbitrary structure to the mathematics of quantum theory, and that
reproduces all the scientific successes of Copenhagen quantum theory within its domain of validity, it would have
solved this fundamental problem. Given the present alternatives, we would, I think, at that point, have to consider
it seriously as a possible account of reality.
Now, in fact, I think that the Everett programme fails in these ambitions, for reasons explained below. I am also
optimistic[3] that we can find simpler one-world versions of quantum theory that have all the aforementioned virtues
and none of the problems that afflict, and I think ultimately doom, the Everett programme. But I see no way to
make either conclusion so transparently true as to eliminate the need for argument.
Fourth, it matters – it is scientifically important to understand – whether the Everettian programme can possibly
succeed. If Everettians really could produce a theory of reality with all the proclaimed virtues, it would clearly
weaken (though not eliminate) the motivation for other attempts at solving the quantum reality problem – just as
finding a consistent quantum theory of gravity would weaken (though not eliminate) the motivation for looking for
others. Conversely, if, as I argue, the Everettian programme has fairly definitely failed, then the problem of finding a
viable formulation of quantum theory applicable to closed quantum systems looms rather large among the concerns
of theoretical physics. The failure of the Everett programme adds to the likelihood that the fundamental problem is
not our inability to interpret quantum theory correctly but rather a limitation of quantum theory itself. If so, my
guess is that we most likely won’t find an adequate cosmological theory so long as we assume that quantum theory
is universally valid – so we should be looking for possible signals of the failure of quantum theory applied to the
universe. Likewise, if so, quantum interference quite likely breaks down somewhere between the microscopic and the
macroscopic – so we should be working harder to characterize the most promising types of experiment to test this.
Everettian ideas have been around for fifty years, and influential for at least the last thirty. Yet there has never
been a consensus among theoretical physicists either that an Everettian account of quantum theory can be made
precise and made to work, or that the Everettian programme has been comprehensively refuted. These questions are
quite central to the future of theoretical, experimental and observational physics. We need to resolve them and move
forward.
B. Everett’s elusive essence
“When he died, his heirs found nothing save chaotic manuscripts. His family, as you may be aware,
wished to condemn them to the fire; but his executor – a Taoist or Buddhist monk – insisted on their
publication.”
“We descendants of Ts’ui Peˆn,” I replied, “continue to curse that monk. Their publication was senseless.
The book is an indeterminate heap of contradictory drafts.”
(Jorge Luis Borges, The Garden of Forking Paths [4])
“ . . . so crowded with . . . empty sophistication that it is extremely difficult to perceive the simple errors
at the basis. It is like fighting the hydra – cut off one ugly head, and eight formalizations take its place.”
(P.K. Feyerabend, How to Defend Society Against Science [5])
After fifty years, there is no well-defined, generally agreed set of assumptions and postulates that together con-
stitute “the Everett interpretation of quantum theory”. Far from it: Everett[1, 2], DeWitt[7], Graham[8], Hartle[6],
Geroch[10], Deutsch[11], Deutsch[12], Saunders[13], Barbour[14] (partly inspired by Bell[15], though Bell’s aim was
not to inspire), Albert-Loewer[16], Coleman[17], Lockwood[18], Wallace[19], Wallace[20], Vaidman[21], Papineau[22],
Greaves[23], Greaves-Myrvold[24], Gell-Mann and Hartle[25], Zurek[26] and Tegmark[27], among many others, have
offered distinctive and often fundamentally conflicting views on what precisely one needs to assume in order to get
the Everett programme off the ground, and what precisely an Everettian (or, some say, post-Everettian) version of
quantum theory entails.
I am primarily interested here in contrasting realist “one-world” and “many-worlds” accounts of quantum theory.
By one-worlders, I mean those who aim to find a version of quantum theory in which quantum experiments really
have only one outcome, we really have only one version of our future selves at any future time, and some intrinsic
randomness in nature determines which outcome occurs and which future self is realised from among the range of
possibilities defined by the theory. For example, within its domain of validity, the Copenhagen interpretation of
3quantum theory is a one-world theory. By many-worlders, I mean those who share Everett’s view that a unitarily
evolving quantum state vector should be interpreted as directly representing reality, and the future versions of ourselves
that observe different outcomes of quantum experiments should be interpreted as equally real.
So, I will not discuss here attempts at “post-Everettian” interpretations like those of Gell-Mann and Hartle[25] and
Zurek[26], which fall into neither camp, and seem – despite much critical probing – unclear on, or uncommitted to
taking a stance on, precisely what, if anything, in the theory corresponds to objective external reality. (Extensive
critiques of Gell-Mann and Hartle’s approach can however be found elsewhere[28–33].)
My main focus is on the recent attempts by Wallace[19, 20], Greaves and Myrvold[24], and, to a lesser extent,
Papineau[22] and Saunders[13], to define, analyse and test realist many-worlds interpretations. These authors offer
different, and on some points mutually inconsistent, approaches, but nonetheless share enough common perspectives
to be considered together. Their papers include some very interesting and creative arguments, which raise important
scientific questions. However, I will argue below that none of their approaches produces a scientifically adequate
version of quantum theory.
Shadowing these discussions is the spectre of the ’many-minds interpretation’ set out some time ago by Albert and
Loewer [16]. Essentially everyone, including Albert and Loewer, agrees that the many-minds interpretation, while
logically consistent and in accord with the data, is utterly unsatisfactory, since it adds to the Everettian formalism
a collection of ad hoc postulates which not only are (even by Everettian standards) fantastic, but also undercut the
motivation for taking Everett seriously, namely that it purports to explain how to make sense of quantum theory
without adding extra equations or interpretational postulates. So, no one – certainly no one represented in this volume
– wants to be a many-minder. And here lies the problem: it seems to me (and to others – see in particular Albert’s
contribution[34] to this volume) that, at various points in their arguments, Saunders, Wallace, Greaves-Myrvold
and Papineau tacitly – and, since they reject the many-minds interpretation, illegitimately – appeal to many-minds
intuitions. Indeed, at least in the first three cases, it seems to me that if one fleshed their ideas out into a fully coherent
and complete interpretation, one would necessarily arrive either at the many-minds interpretation or something even
worse. I will elaborate on this below.
Of course, these discussions crucially turn on our understanding of what counts as scientifically adequate. The
idea that reality contains many essentially independent quasiclassical worlds corresponding to different possible cos-
mological and experimental outcomes clearly isn’t, per se, susceptible to logical refutation. That isn’t at issue. The
key question, to my mind — and I think modern Everettians, including the authors considered here, generally agree
— is whether we can find an appealingly simple version of quantum theory in which a realist many-worlds ontology
is essential (i.e. there is no equally simple one-world variant) and which (at minimum) replicates all the scientific
successes of one-world quantum theory (i.e. quantum theory including some form of the projection postulate, or some
principle from which it can, approximately and within a suitable domain of validity, be derived). I believe that we
can’t. In particular, it seems to me the Everettian programme has not produced and cannot produce a scientifically
adequate alternative account that reproduces the standard one-world account of probabilistic inferences derived from
quantum theory – despite the ingenious recent attempts of contributors to this volume.
Some commentators sympathetic to the Everettian programme[22, 24] argue that a double standard is at work
here: that criticisms of the Everettian programme’s attempt to account for the appearance of probability can and
should equally well be applied to the standard understanding of the role of probability in one-world versions of
quantum theory, and indeed of probabilistic scientific statements in general. To respond to this point, I consider
below some fundamental differences between randomness (or apparent randomness) in one-world quantum theory and
its purported Everettian analogue, and point out what seem to me irresolvable problems with the latter.
II. ONE-WORLD THEORIES AND PROBABILITY
Copenhagen quantum theory is a one-world version of quantum theory: any given experiment or quantum event has
a number of possible outcomes, but only one actual outcome. Some other non-Everettian variants and modifications
of quantum theory, such as de Broglie-Bohm theory and dynamical collapse models, similarly randomly select from
many possible physical evolutions, and can be (and usually are) interpreted as defining a unique quasiclassical world.
The consistent histories approach [25], if combined with an (alas unknown) suitable set selection rule, would also
lead naturally to a one-world interpretation, in which reality is described by one randomly chosen history from the
selected set. And these by now venerable contenders certainly don’t exhaust the possible options.[3] My aim here is
not to advocate a specific one-world version or variant of quantum theory, or to assess the current state of the art, but
rather to compare and contrast one-world and many-world accounts of probability. For that purpose, let us suppose,
for the sake of argument, that we have to hand a particular one-world theory that implies that, while the universe
could have evolved in a (presumably very large) number of different ways, one quasiclassically evolving world – the
one we observe – was randomly selected.
4One-world versions of quantum theory, together with hypotheses about the initial conditions and unitary evolution,
predict the probabilities of our experimental results and observations. We test the theory and these hypotheses by
checking whether the results are of a form we would typically expect given the predicted probabilities. In practice,
pretty much everyone agrees on the methodology of theory confirmation, at least sufficiently so that, for example,
everyone agrees that, within the domain of validity of Copenhagen quantum theory, the Born rule is very well confirmed
statistically. However, there is much less agreement on how, or even whether, we can make sense of fundamentally
probabilistic physical theories. What exactly, if anything, does it mean to say that the probability of the universe
turning out the way it did was 0.00038?
Everettian authors have stressed this last point lately. We should not, they argue, apply different standards to
one-world and many-worlds quantum theory. If our account of standard probability applied to one-world quantum
theory is suspect, or incomplete, or involves ad hoc postulates, we cannot reasonably reject an alternative many-worlds
account on the grounds that it runs into difficulties that might, on close analysis, turn out to be precisely analogous.
There are several possible responses for one-worlders here. One response is to try to defend or buttress or further
develop frequentism, or another standard account of standard probability. A second is to try to point out some
insuperable problems with many-worlds accounts of probability, and thus make the case that, whatever difficulties
one-world quantum theory might run into, many-worlds quantum theory cannot possibly be satisfactory. A third is
to argue that the difficulties that many-worlders face in dealing with probability are worse than – not, as claimed,
precisely analogous to – those faced by one-worlders.
I think the first of these options is worth pursuing. I think too that the second and third lines of argument are
valid, and I will develop them later. But, in this section, I want to make a separate point. I want to suggest a non-
standard account in which the scientific space usually occupied by one-world probabilistic theories is filled instead by
deterministic theories with a large amount of theoretically unspecified data. This allows us to compare, verify and
falsify theories, and to recover essentially all of current science, without assigning a fundamental role to probability per
se. Convinced believers in a chancy world might regard this as a useful fall-back position pending a fully satisfactory
explanation of standard probability. It might, alternatively, be seen as an account with enough attractions of its
own that it could be preferable to any standard account involving probability. Either way, it offers a way of making
scientific sense of one-world quantum theory that has no many-worlds analogue.
Consider a probabilistic theory T , and suppose for simplicity that it predicts a finite set of probabilistic events,
labelled by the index i, each with finitely many possible outcomes xji , labelled by the index j ∈ Ji, for which it
predicts nonzero probabilities pji . For simplicity, we also suppose for the moment that the possible outcomes for any
given event, and their probabilities, are independent of the outcome of any other event. We say two events i and i′
are of the same type, according to T , if the sets {pji} and {pji′} are identical. Let B = {0, 1}, B∗ = {∅, 0, 1, 00, 01, . . .}
be the set of finite binary strings, and Br the set of length r binary strings. Let n =
∏
i |Ji| be the size of the list of
possible sets of outcomes, which we write as N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
A length r code for the outcomes is any surjective map C : Br → N . Given such a code, we can define an alternative
probabilistic theory TC by stipulating that a binary string b in Br is randomly chosen from the uniform distribution,
and that the outcomes are given by C(b). By taking r sufficiently large, and choosing C so that |{b : C(b) = i}| ≈ 2rp(i)
for each i ∈ N , we can find theories TC whose probability assignments are arbitrarily close to those of T .
A length r subcode for the outcomes is any map (not necessarily surjective) C : Br → N . Again, given a subcode,
we can define a probabilistic theory TC as above: here TC may assign zero probability to some outcomes for which
T assigns non-zero probability.
We can define another type of theory from the triple (TC , C, r): a theory that simply states that the data will be
those predicted by TC and C given some length r binary string as input, and makes no prediction about the binary
string. We call this theory D(TC , C, r), using D to emphasize that we now regard the theory as deterministic. One
might view the binary string in D(TC , C, r) as playing a role analogous to a constant of nature in a deterministic
theory: its value is not fixed by the theory, and can only be determined empirically. In this case, even if the map C
is injective, determining the entire string would require observing every random event in the universe.
Now, on the view that there is a unique “correct” fundamentally probabilistic theory of nature T , each probabilistic
theory of the form TC must be either equivalent to T (which is possible only if the probabilities pji are all dyadic),
or else incorrect (though possibly a good approximation to T ). Note though that, given a finite set of data, many
other probabilistic theories besides T , including some of the form TC , will be consistent with the data. Indeed, we
would generally expect some theories T ′ to fit the data better than T , in the sense that the same sets of events are of
the same type according to T and T ′, and the probabilities p′ji are closer than p
j
i to the observed relative frequencies
for events of the same type. If we nonetheless regard T as likelier to be correct than T ′, it must be for reasons other
than purely empirical – presumably on grounds of elegance or simplicity. And if we maintain that there is a unique
correct fundamental theory, it seems to follow that the correct theory is determined by a set of probabilities {pji}
not determined by the physical universe (although perhaps very well approximated by relative frequencies of physical
events).
5Here’s an alternative view. It may be, if not meaningless, then at least unnecessary, to appeal to the idea of a
unique correct fundamentally probabilistic theory of nature, or even to define probability as a fundamental physical
concept. Instead of considering probabilistic theories TC , we can compare deterministic theories D(TC , C, r) against
one another and against the data. In evaluating these theories, we use the criteria of simplicity and elegance. These
criteria have no precise mathematical definition. They include judgements about the form of TC and C, as well as
the parameter r (which is a precise measure of complexity for the part of the theory defined by the unknown binary
string). In saying that one theory D(TC , C, r) is our best current theory – or perhaps that our best descriptions of
nature are given by a class of similar such theories – we mean that we can’t presently find a substantially simpler
and more elegant theory that fits the data. The stronger meta-theoretic hypothesis that a theory D(TC , C, r) is, up
to approximate equivalence, the best theory of nature implies that, given all the physical data in the universe, one
would not be able to find a simpler, more elegant, compelling theory.
This could be made more quantitative by formalising the discussion within the context of a fixed model of computa-
tion, for instance a (classical) Turing machine. (This is why we have chosen to consider theories with unknown binary
strings, although of course bases other than binary could also be used.) Here, a theory is a program for generating
a mathematical representation of the complete set of physical data. A theory with unknown data is a program that
requires an unknown input string of stipulated length. The theory’s simplicity depends, inter alia, on both the length
of the program and the length of the required input string. Each of these is a natural simplicity parameter. The
halting time of the program is another significant parameter, which gives one way of quantifying the elegance of a
theory.
In principle, within a fixed computation model, it’s possible to carry out an exhaustive search of all theories with
total length ≤ L that halt after ≤ N steps. In principle, thus, given all the physical data, one can test the hypothesis
that D(TC , C, r) is the best theory among all those whose program and input strings satisfy given length bounds,
and which satisfy other stipulated simplicity and elegance constraints, that halt after any given finite time, relative
to a fixed computation model.
Thus, instead of talking about a probabilistic physical theory that produces a random set of physical data, we can
consider a deterministic physical theory whose definition includes a set of pre-determined but a priori unknown physical
data, together with the meta-theoretic hypothesis that this description is essentially algorithmically incompressible.
If we learn empirically that the data are in fact significantly compressible, then this hypothesis is refuted, and we
may replace the theory by a more economical one.
It should be stressed that these measures of simplicity and elegance are by no means intended to be an exhaustive
list. For example, another elegance criterion is given by the principle of scientific induction, which suggests we should
prefer a theory that suggests that a hitherto apparently fair coin will continue to be apparently fair over one that
suggests that it will henceforth always come up heads, even though the latter theory requires a shorter input string
(and so is simpler by one of the above measures).[53] Comparing scientific theories generally involves a wide and
arguable variety of quantitative and qualitative simplicity and elegance criteria, and nothing in this account alters
that: the aim here is only to propose a different treatment of apparent randomness when comparing theories.
A. Example: reinterpreting a fair coin
For example, in a universe with an apparently random process that apparently mimics a fair coin and produces a
large number N of apparently independent outcomes, our meta-theoretic hypothesis might suggest that we cannot
find a simpler correct theory than one that states that the length N binary string is essentially algorithmically
incompressible. If, in fact, the string S turns out to consist of 0.01N zeroes and 0.99N ones, we can certainly generate
a more economical theory, and this hypothesis is refuted.
According to the standard account of probabilistic theories, if a probabilistic theory PT says that zeroes and ones
are equiprobable and independently generated, the outcome S is extremely improbable, but not logically impossible.
The theory PT is thus not logically refuted by the outcome S. In practice we would reject it – but, without a
fundamentally satisfactory account of probability, it is hard to give a completely satisfactory justification for doing
so.
In our alternative account, however, no such problem arises. Our hypothesis predicts that a given physical dataset
is essentially incompressible — where “essentially” incorporates some judgements about the tradeoffs between small
gains in compression of the dataset and simplicity and elegance in other aspects of the theory. If the dataset turns
out to be a string such as S that is significantly compressible, so that we can fit the data by a simpler theory, the
hypothesis is falsified and the original theory replaced.
6B. Example: reinterpreting a biased coin
Now consider a universe with an apparently random process that apparently mimics a coin with bias p > 1
2
towards
zero and produces N apparently independent outcomes. We can then produce theories that state that the length
N binary string is compressible to H(p)N + o(N) bits. For example, a theory which says that the length N string
will contain between pN − 10√N and pN + 10√N zeroes has the required compression, since we can binary code all
such strings in a code of length H(p)N + o(N). Clearly there are many somewhat similar such theories — the string
contains between pN − 9√N and pN +9√N zeroes, between pN − 11√N and pN +11√N zeroes, and so on. On this
view of scientific accounts of apparently random data, that’s the best one can hope for: generically, no single clearly
optimal theory will emerge. However, we can hypothesize that theories of roughly this length are essentially best
possible – i.e. that the string cannot be compressed to significantly shorter than H(p)N bits – and this hypothesis is
testable and falsifiable.
Again, these theories reproduce deterministically predictions that the standard probabilistic theory says hold with
probability very close (but not equal) to one. They exclude some very low probability events which would, if realised,
in practice persuade almost everyone that the probabilistic theory was wrong, even though their occurrence is logically
consistent with the theory.
C. Conclusion
According to this account, we should consider one-world quantum theory as a theory which requires a binary string
as input, and consider it alongside the meta-theoretic hypotheses that (a) there is no significantly more compressed
description of the data obtained from quantum experiments than that given by encoding them in binary, using a
coding that would produce an approximately uniform distribution over binary strings if the data were probabilistically
generated via the Born rule, (b) the data can indeed be thus described. If one of these hypotheses turns out to be
incorrect – if, for example, the data in all Bell experiments consistently show significantly greater violations of the
CHSH inequality than quantum theory predicts – then we must find a better theory. Conversely, the theory logically
(not merely with high probability) implies that we will see no consistent regularities in our experimental data that
would, on the usual account, be highly improbable.
Among the scientific virtues of this account, as I see it, are its explicitness about the provisional nature of our
theories, and its undogmatic sidestepping of the problem of giving a fundamental meaning to probability. It recognizes
the possibility that random-seeming data may turn out to have a simpler description. It recognizes too that, if we find
consistent regularities that a probabilistic theory says are highly improbable, then we should and will feel impelled
to produce a better theory. At the same time, it stays silent on the question of whether random-seeming physical
data are genuinely randomly generated in some fundamental sense, and hence avoids the need to explain what such
an assertion could really mean and how we could be persuaded of its truth.
One-world quantum theory, read in this way, allows us to draw logical inferences about the physical world. It
predicts – it is not merely consistent with the fact – that there will be no regularities in the data of a type that
would allow for a significantly simpler theoretical description. If that prediction turns out to be wrong, the theory
is refuted. Interpreted thus, one-world quantum theory can be read as a well-formulated scientific theory, in a way
that allows a straightforward account of scientific confirmation and refutation. If we assume it is correct, we have an
explanation for the apparent fact that our evolutionary and experimental histories contain no regularities that would
be inexplicably improbable according to the Born rule. To the extent that the project outlined above can be fleshed
out and succeeds – and I am optimistic that it can and does – proponents of one-world quantum theory can rest
relatively easy on the question of randomness.
III. TOY MANY-WORLDS THEORIES AND THEIR USES
If we knew of probability theory only through its use in Copenhagen quantum theory – if we had no familiarity with
coin tosses, dice rolls, noise, or any other effectively unpredictable classical systems – we would probably be (even
more) deeply confused about the nature of both quantum theory and probability. I suspect this is the cause of much
of the continuing confusion over many-worlds quantum theory: discussions need simultaneously to grapple with the
quite unfamiliar concept of many branching worlds and the specific peculiarities of Everettian quantum theory.
This motivates defining some simpler many-worlds theories. Another reason for doing so is that some key Everettian
ideas – for example, Greaves and Myrvold’s attempt [24] at an account of many-worlds theory confirmation – can really
only sensibly be discussed if we can consider a class of many-worlds theories, not just the single example of Everettian
7quantum theory. Readers may initially find the form of the following theories a little intellectually unsettling, but I
recommend persevering: they shed a great deal of light on Everettian arguments.
Let me stress right away that these are not perfect models for Everettian quantum theory. That is, in fact, part of
the point: they allow us to separate out general claims about rationality and theory confirmation in multiverse theories
from claims that rely on specific features of quantum theory. In particular, they allow us to see why Greaves-Myrvold’s
account of many-world theory confirmation doesn’t work.
A. Some toy multiverses
The following toy multiverses are all classical, in the sense that the state of any branch at any time is defined by a
classical physical theory, and they all have a definite branching structure.
Consider, first, the branching multiverse CBU1, which includes conscious inhabitants, and also includes a machine
with a red button on it and a tape emerging from it, with a sequence of numbers on it, all in the range 0 to (N − 1).
Whenever the red button is pressed in some universe within the multiverse, that universe is deleted, and N successor
universes are then created. All the successors are in the same classical state as the original (and so, by hypothesis,
all include conscious inhabitants with the same memories as those who have just been deleted), except that a new
number has been written onto the end of the tape, with the number i being written in the i-th successor universe.
Suppose, too, that the multiverse’s inhabitants believe that something like this is indeed happening. The numbers
on the tape play a significant role in their society. In particular, it is quite common to place bets on future numbers,
and social mores ensure that such bets are always honoured. Of course, since one’s own universe will be destroyed
before the next number is written, placing such a bet means – they correctly believe – redistributing resources amongst
one’s successors. Some inhabitants may find reasons for preferring some redistributions over others. We need not
discuss yet precisely what these reasons and preferences (both of which may be different for different inhabitants)
may be.
It might be helpful to imagine that the universes are being run on a simulator by technologically advanced beings,
who simply end one simulation whenever the red button is pressed, and then start simulating the successor universes
from the appropriate initial states. We will sometimes assume that the inhabitants, indeed, believe this to be the
case.
Suppose, further, that some of the inhabitants of CBU1 have acquired the theoretical idea that the laws of their
multiverse might attach weights to branches, i.e. a number pi is attached to branch i, where pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i pi = 1.
They may have different theories about how these weights are defined: for instance, that the weights are always {pi},
that they are always {qi}, that they vary over time according to some rule, and so on. As it happens, though, these
theories are all incorrect: there are no weights attached to the branches. To be clear: this is not to say that the
branches have equal weight. Nor are they necessarily physically identical aside from the tape numbers. They may
perhaps be distinguished by other features: for example, if they are simulations, they may be simulated by different
hardware or software. However, any such differences do not yield any natural quantitative definition of branch weights.
There is just no fact of the matter about branch weights in this multiverse.
The multiverse CBU2 is similar to CBU1. In this universe, there are indeed numbers attached to the branches, but
the way they are attached means that they should (by our lights, and also by the inhabitants’, if only they understood
the full picture) have no significance to any decisions the inhabitants make about bets/redistributions. For instance,
we could extend the simulation idea, and imagine that the technologically advanced beings simply choose, on whim,
to write the number pi somewhere inconspicuous in the simulation of successor universe i, in such a way that it has
no effect on the inhabitants, and that it has no other significance.
The multiverse CBU3 is similar to CBU2. However, this time the numbers attached to the branches by the physical
theory are attached in such a way that it can be plausibly argued that they could reasonably play a significant role
in the decisions the inhabitants make about bets/redistributions. For instance, we could imagine that when the
technologically advanced beings create successor universes, they create not just one successor corresponding to each
outcome i, but a number of distinct successor universes, all identical apart from their outcome values, and the number
containing outcome i is proportional to the weight pi. (We assume here the pi are rational numbers.)
B. Some possible strategies
Consider an inhabitant of any of the above multiverses, who believes that the weight pi is attached to the outcome
i. Suppose they are offered a variety of bets that give their successor a good Gi in a universe in which outcome i
obtains, and they (the original inhabitant) attach utility Ui to this good. We suppose the Ui are finite real numbers,
not necessarily positive (the goods may be bads); and, of course, both Gi and Ui depend on the bet.
8How might they proceed to evaluate and rank such bets? Weight-sensitive inhabitants believe that branch weights
exist and should play a role in their betting preferences. Weight-indifferent inhabitants may also believe that the
physical theory attaches weights, but if so, do not believe they are of any relevance to a rational betting strategy.
(Such an inhabitant might, for example, believe that they live in a multiverse like CBU2.) Among their options is
to mimic the strategy of a weight-sensitive inhabitant, except that they treat all branch weights as equal. By this
means, given any weight-sensitive strategy, we can define a corresponding weight-indifferent strategy. Here are some
examples of weight-sensitive strategies:
• The mean utilitarian ranks bets according to the value of ∑i piUi.
• The Price-Rawlsian’s dominant concern[35, 36] is with the welfare of their least satisfied future self. They rank
bets first according to min(Ui), and then some list of tie-breaking criteria. To be definite, let’s say their next
criterion is the value of
∑
pj , summed over all j such that Uj = min(Ui), followed by min(Uj : Uj 6= min(Ui)),
and so on.
• The future self elitist’s dominant concern is that the best possible version of their future self should be realized
somewhere; they have little interest in mediocre future selves, whom they regard as losers. Their bet rankings
are thus dominated by max(Ui), and they break ties using the mirror image of the Price-Rawlsian’s criteria.
• The rivalrous future self elitist takes things one stage further. Not only do they identify their interests exclusively
with those of their best possible future self, but they regard that self as in competition with the others, and feel
happiest – all else being equal – if that competition is won by as large a margin as possible. They rank bets
first by max(Ui), then by max(Ui)−max(Uj : Uj 6= max(Ui))), and so on.
• The median utilitarian’s dominant concern is for median utility. Reordering the index labels so that U1 ≤ U2 ≤
. . . ≤ Un, let j be such that
∑j−1
i=1 pi <
1
2
and
∑j
i=1 pi ≥ 12 : they rank bets first according to the value of Uj .
(They also have some tie-breaking criteria: one option is to break ties by considering the mean utility.)
• The x-percentile utilitarian’s dominant concern is for the utility of the future self ranked at x% in the distribution.
They proceed like the median utilitarian, with 1
2
replaced by x
100
. The Price-Rawlsian, median utilitarian and
future self elitist are all special cases.
• The future self democrat believes her preference should be that which would result from a democratic vote among
her future selves. Given a finite list of possible bets, for each value of x, she asks herself how she would order
her preferences among the bets, if she knew that she would become the future self ranked at the x-percentile
of the elected bet. (The answer might be that her future self’s voting preference would always be dominated
by its own welfare under this hypothesis, but it need not: it depends whether she cares about the welfare of
contemporaneous versions of herself in other branches.) She then tallies the votes, integrating over x using
branch weight measure, and using, say, a single transferable vote system. The winner of the vote is her preferred
bet. If the election is tied, she has more than one equally preferred bet.
• An example of a future self distribution engineer is someone who seeks to maximise an expression of the form
∑
i
f1(Ui)pi +
∑
ij
f2(Ui, Uj)pipj + . . . , (1)
where the Ui are the utilities of future branches with weights pi, and fn is some given joint function of n
variables.[54]
C. Many-worlds rationality reconsidered in toy models
“If you do what you’ve always done, you’ll get what you always got.”
(variously attributed)
According to Wallace [20] and Greaves-Myrvold [24], we should define rational behaviour in a multiverse via axioms
generalizing those proposed by Savage[41] in order to justify using the standard calculus of probabilities and utility
functions for rational decisions in a single world in which future events are uncertain.
91. Savagean rationality in one world
Savage, engagingly and rather admirably, presented his approach to rationality in the presence of (one-world)
uncertainty
“. . . in a tentative spirit, for I realize that the serious blemishes in it apparent to me are not the only
ones that will be discovered by critical readers.” [42]
Everettian neo-Savageans [20, 24], as I read them, seem rather less self-critical — puzzlingly so, since applying
Savagean decision theory to Everettian quantum theory raises many new questions without solving any of the old
ones. This raises some general worries, which are developed to some extent elsewhere in this paper, but might also
be taken in other directions. First, if Savage’s axioms are, in fact, unable to give a completely satisfactory account of
ideal rational behaviour in the presence of one-world uncertainty, it seems very unlikely that a completely satisfactory
axiomatic treatment of many-worlds rationality can be produced by generalizing them. Second, giving a satisfactory
account of ideal rational behaviour in the presence of one-world uncertainty (or some many-worlds generalization)
may in any case not be enough. (For one thing, we are not ideal rational agents. For another, as Albert [34] has
eloquently stressed, there is a crucial difference between showing that one can find a rational justification for behaving
as though the world were a certain way and showing that the world actually is that way.) Third, however far Savage
can or cannot guide rational agents in one uncertain world, it isn’t obvious that his programme generalizes at all to
many-worlds theories in general or to Everettian quantum theory in particular.
2. Many-worlds rationality according to Greaves-Myrvold
Let me now focus on Greaves-Myrvold’s axioms, which are intended to apply to general many-worlds theories,
and so can straightforwardly be considered within the toy models described above. I will consider later Wallace’s
arguments, which are framed for the special case of Everettian quantum theory, and for the moment simply note that
their logic suggests the same conclusions here as Greaves-Myrvold’s.
In Greaves-Myrvold’s view, the mean utilitarian’s strategy is rationally justifiable, and the others are branded
irrational, since they violate one or more of the axioms. For example, the future self elitist and the Price-Rawlsian
violate their continuity postulate, P6, the median utilitarian violates P2, the future self democrat violates transitivity,
P1a, and the rivalrous future self elitist the dominance postulate P3.
However, the fact is that each of these strategies is well-defined and has a coherent motivation (and many other such
examples could also be constructed). To brand them irrational seems to me itself irrational dogma. Even the most
contentious case, the rivalrous future self elitist, has a coherent, if ungenerous, philosophy of life in the multiverse and a
rational strategy for implementing it. Note too that some of these strategies have arguable theoretical advantages over
the mean utilitarian strategy. For instance, one can be an x-percentile utilitarian, or a future self democrat (if they
are purely self-concerned, in the sense that each future self’s preferences among options are completely determined by
the implications for its own welfare), without having to quantify the utility of the possible outcomes: one needs only a
preference ordering. This is arguably advantageous, since even if one accepts Savage’s postulates [41] and, hence, the
conclusion that one’s preferences must be defined by some utility function, it may be difficult or even impractical to
compute the relevant function for general outcomes, and yet relatively easy to identify preferences among any finite
list of outcomes.
In short, Greaves-Myrvold’s postulates only express in more abstract form a preference for being a mean utilitarian
– i.e., for one possible choice among many. Their postulates are plausible possible prescriptions for rational behaviour
when considering the welfare of a population of future selves, but also logically inconsistent with other plausible
prescriptions. This shouldn’t come as a complete surprise: after all, Arrow’s celebrated impossibility theorem [43]
taught us that plausible decision theoretic principles for populations may be inconsistent.
Granted, the one-world counterparts of some of these strategies may look peculiar. But one can consistently
accept the many-worlds strategies as rational and reject their one-world counterparts. As Price [35] has persuasively
argued, many-worlds agents can offer reasoned justifications for their strategies that aren’t available to their one-world
counterparts. The many-worlds future self elitist knows that his best possible future self will be an actual future self,
while his one world counterpart doesn’t. The many-worlds future self democrat knows that there really will be a
population of future selves who have preferences among the betting choices, while her one world counterpart knows
there won’t be; and so on.
One could, of course, adopt a weaker position. One could take Greaves-Myrvold’s and Wallace’s accounts of
rationality as simply suggesting a possible attitude one might adopt to life in an Everettian multiverse, an attitude
defined by a set of rules which are consistent and have some pleasant mathematical features but which are not meant to
constitute a dogma. On this liberal reading, Greaves-Myrvold’s preferred strategy could be termed “rational”, in the
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sense of being well-defined and internally consistent, without denying the existence of other equally rational strategies.
The problem is that abandoning any claim of uniqueness also removes the purported connection between theoretical
reasoning and empirical data, and this is disastrous for the programme of attempting to interpret Everettian quantum
theory via decision theory. If Wallace’s arguments are read as suggesting no more than that one can consistently
adopt the Born rule if one pleases, it remains a mystery as to how and why we arrived at the Born rule empirically.
If Greaves-Myrvold’s arguments are read as merely suggesting a possible attitude one might choose to take about
testing and confirming many-worlds theories, one’s left to investigate how many other equally valid attitudes there
might be, and whether they mightn’t – disastrously – imply the confirmation of inconsistent theories from the same
data.
D. Rationality and feasibility
Consider now a rather more complicated multiverse, CBU4. Here, the universes are definitely being simulated by
technologically advanced beings, and the inhabitants know it. They also know that, after the red button is pressed,
there is a list of outcomes i, and that the list is indeterminately long (and possibly infinite). They know too that,
for each i, some number of successor universes containing outcome i will be created. They do not know the number
of successors there will be of each type: these vary for each i, and vary each time the button is pressed, at the
whim of the simulators. What they do know – because, let’s say, the simulators have credibly promised them – is
that numbers playing the role of additive weights, following certain rules, will be written inconspicuously into each
simulated universe. Thus, if their universe has the number x written in it, and the red button is pressed, and there are
ni successor universes with outcome i, these successors will have numbers of the form xq
j
i written into them, where
the label j runs from 1 to ni, q
j
i ≥ 0, and
∑
j
qji = pi . (2)
Here the pi are known to be constants (i.e. they take the same value each time the button is pressed), with pi ≥ 0, and∑
i pi = 1. The inhabitants know the values of a finite set of the pi, those with index i ∈ I, whose sum
∑
i∈I pi < 1.
What the inhabitants would like to do – what they feel rationality would mandate they do if they could – is express
betting/distribution preferences that value each successor universe equally. But they can’t – they don’t know how
many successors will be created for any given i, nor do they know how long the list of possible outcomes i is. Nor can
they express betting/distribution preferences that value each outcome equally, regardless of the number of successor
universes containing it – again, they don’t know how long the list of possible outcomes is.
What they can do is express betting/distribution preferences, for bets on the known possible outcomes, treating
the known values of pi as probability weights. Doing so is equivalent to treating a successor universe with the number
y written into it as having an importance proportional to y – a rule which can be consistently applied, despite their
ignorance about the number of successors of each type, because of equation (2). So, they have a consistent, feasible
strategy available to them. Moreover, if they want to assign a measure of importance to each individual universe,
and they want the importance they assign to the set of universes containing outcome i to be independent of the
number of such universes, this is the only available rule. Nonetheless, it doesn’t seem to have a fundamental rational
justification. The numbers written into the universes happen to follow convenient bookkeeping rules, but they have
no significance: there is no fundamental reason to treat the numbers as a measure of importance of their universes.
From this, I think we should conclude two things, to be borne in mind when we come to consider Wallace’s
arguments. It can make perfect sense, in a multiverse theory, to say that there exists a rational optimal strategy that
is inaccessible to the agents in that multiverse. Conversely, the fact that a strategy is available does not per se make
it rationally compelling, even if it is the unique available strategy satisfying some pleasant consistency properties:
rational compulsion also needs rational justification, which may or may not exist.
IV. WHY MANY-WORLDS THEORY CONFIRMATION DOESN’T WORK
Everettian quantum theory is essentially useless, as a scientific theory, unless it can explain the data that confirm
the validity of Copenhagen quantum theory within its domain – unless, for example, it can explain why we should
expect to observe the Born rule to have been very well confirmed statistically. Evidently, Everettians cannot give
an explanation that says that all observers in the multiverse will observe confirmation of the Born rule, or that very
probably all observers will observe confirmation of the Born rule. On the contrary, many observers in an Everettian
multiverse will definitely observe convincing disconfirmation of the Born rule. Nor can one look at Everettian quantum
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theory and conclude that any given observer in the multiverse will probably observe confirmation: the theory has no
notion of standard probability available to even make sense of any such claim. And if the theory doesn’t explain the
data, the data don’t support the theory.
There seems to be no good way around this, and if so, then that’s the end of Everettian quantum theory as a serious
contender: a theory with no predictive power should lose the scientific competition against theories that predict what
we actually see. However, Greaves and Myrvold [24] have offered an attempt at a solution, by giving a general account
purporting to explain why agents who take seriously the possibility of many-worlds theories can use observational
data to confirm particular theories and refute others. Their account is illuminating, and raises some very interesting
questions about many-worlds theories. Ultimately, though, it seems to me that it does not show, as claimed, the
possibility of explaining our observations from a many-worlds theory and thus confirming one many-worlds theory
against another. Rather, it highlights some apparently insuperable problems that prevent us from doing so. As
Greaves and Myrvold’s arguments are set out in detail elsewhere in this volume, in this discussion I will simply
summarize the implications of their confirmation algorithm in toy models, and point out the problems that arise.
A. The problem of inappropriate self-importance
It suffices to consider very simple many-worlds theories, containing classical branching worlds in which the branches
correspond to binary outcomes of definite experiments. Consider thus the weightless multiverse, a many-worlds theory
of type CBU1, in which the machine produces only two possible outcomes, writing 0 or 1 onto the tape. Recall that in
CBU1 there is no fact of the matter about weights attached to the branches containing 0 outcomes and 1 outcomes,
although the inhabitants think there may be. This is the many-worlds analogue of an indeterministic one-world theory
containing a sequence of binary experimental outcomes which are not only not determined but also not governed by any
probabilistic law. Suppose now that the inhabitants begin a series of experiments in which they push the red button
on the machine a large number, N , times, at regular intervals. Suppose too that the inhabitants believe (correctly)
that this is a series of independent identical experiments, and moreover – this is not essential, but simplifies the
discussion – believe this dogmatically: no pattern in the data will shake their faith. Suppose also that they believe
(incorrectly) that their multiverse is governed by a many-worlds theory with unknown weights attached to 0 and 1
outcomes, identical in each trial, and seek to discover the (actually nonexistent) values of these weights by following
Greaves-Myrvold’s learning algorithm.
After N trials, the multiverse contains 2N branches, corresponding to all N possible binary string outcomes. The
inhabitants on a string with pN zero and (1− p)N one outcomes will, with a degree of confidence that tends towards
one as N gets large, tend to conclude that the weight p is attached to zero outcome branches and weight (1 − p) is
attached to one outcome branches. In other words, everyone, no matter what outcome string they see, tends towards
complete confidence in the belief that the relative frequencies they observe represent the weights.
Let’s consider further the perspective of inhabitants on a branch with pN zero outcomes and (1−p)N one outcomes.
They do not have the delusion that all observed strings have the same relative frequency as theirs: they understand
that, given the hypothesis that they live in a multiverse, every binary string, and hence every relative frequency,
will have been observed by someone. So how do they conclude that the theory that the weights are (p, 1 − p) has
nonetheless been confirmed? Because, following Greaves-Myrvold’s reasoning, they have concluded that the weights
measure the importance of the branches for theory confirmation. Since they believe they have learned that the weights
are (p, 1 − p), they conclude that a branch with r zeroes and (N − r) ones has importance pr(1 − p)N−r. Summing
over all the branches with pN zeroes and (1 − p)N ones, or very close to those frequencies, thus gives a set of total
importance very close to 1; the remaining branches have total importance very close to 0. So, on a set of branches
that dominates the importance measure, the theory that the weights are (very close to) (p, 1 − p) is indeed correct.
All is well! By definition, the important branches are the ones that matter for theory confirmation. The theory is
indeed confirmed!
The problem, of course, is that this reasoning applies equally well for all the inhabitants, whatever relative frequency
p they see on their branch. All of them conclude that their relative frequencies represent (to very good approximation)
the branching weights. All of them conclude that their own branches, together with those with identical or similar
relative frequencies, are the important ones for theory confirmation. All of them thus happily conclude that their
theories have been confirmed. And, recall, all of them are wrong: there are actually no branching weights.
1. Comparison with the one-world case
It’s illuminating to compare the case of an inhabitant of the analogous one-world universe, in which pressing the
red button produces either a 0 or a 1 on the tape but there is no law, either deterministic or probabilistic, governing
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these outcomes. After N experiments in which he sees pN zeroes and (1− p)N ones, he tends towards confidence in
the theory that zeroes have probability p and ones have probability (1− p).
Let us again restrict attention to theories — in this case probabilistic one-world theories — that dogmatically assume
the experiments are identical and independent. Among such theories, the selected theory does indeed characterize,
better than all its competitors, all the relevant data in the universe — i.e., all the outcomes of the N experiments. Of
course, further data could change that conclusion. But, so long as we consider only the relevant data, it’s something
of a puzzle to pin down whether it’s wrong to adopt the theory pro tem, and if so precisely why. Is there a physically
meaningful sense in which a universe that looks as though it contains data resulting from a sequence of independent
identical coin tosses with a probability p of outcome zero is distinct from one that does contain such data? And if so,
how precisely should we characterize the distinction?
On the view of physical randomness discussed in section II, the answer to the first question is no. In any case,
however one answers the questions, it seems that any possible error here must be subtler than and distinct from the
error highlighted above in the many-worlds case. In the many-worlds case, recall, all observers are aware that other
observers in worlds with other data must exist, but each is led to construct a spurious measure of importance that
favours their own observations against the others’, and this leads to an obvious absurdity. In the one-world case,
observers treat what actually happened as important, and ignore what didn’t happen: this doesn’t lead to the same
difficulty.
2. Numbers in the sky
Consider next the decorative weight multiverse, a type CBU2 variant of the weightless universe. This universe has a
constant of nature fixed by the technologically advanced beings, a real number p, with 0 < p < 1. As before, whenever
the red button is pressed in a simulated universe, that universe is deleted, and successor universes with outcomes 0
and 1 written on the tape are initiated. This time, the technologically advanced beings also write the numbers p and
(1− p) in an inaccessible part of the skies of the 0 and 1 successor universes, respectively. These numbers are visible
to the inhabitants, but have no other physical significance.
There is thus a formal sense in which distinct weights are attached to the 0 and 1 branches. However, by hypothesis,
these weights are decorative: there are no rational grounds for assigning them any fundamental physical meaning or
any roˆle in constraining rational actions. We can thus run through a discussion of theory confirmation precisely
parallel to that for the weightless multiverse.
This illustrates again that the mere fact that Born weights are mathematically defined in Everettian quantum
theory does not per se justify assigning them any role in theory confirmation. They could be merely decorative.
B. Separating caring weights from theory confirmation
To investigate further it’s helpful to consider branching world models in which there are weights attached to the
branches, in such a way that the weights could plausibly be regarded as important for making rational decisions. I
want here to tell specific stories about the weights, in order to illustrate a crucial distinction between two possible
definitions of importance.
1. The replicating multiverse
Consider first the replicating multiverse, a multiverse of type CBU3 with a machine like the one above, in which
the branches arise as the result of technologically advanced beings running simulations. Whenever the red button is
pressed in a simulated universe, that universe is deleted, and successor universes with outcomes 0 and 1 written on the
tape are initiated. Suppose, in this case, that each time, the beings create three identical simulations with outcome 0,
and just one with outcome 1. From the perspective of the inhabitants, there is no way to detect that outcomes 0 and
1 are being treated differently, and so they represent them in their theories with one branch each. In fact, though,
given this representation, there is an at least arguably natural sense in which they ought to assign to the outcome
0 branch three times the importance of the outcome 1 branch: in other words, they ought to assign branch weights
(3
4
, 1
4
).
They don’t know this. But suppose, as before, that they believe that there are unknown weights attached to the
branches, and follow the Greaves-Myrvold procedure for identifying those weights. What happens now? After N runs
of the experiment, there will actually be 4N simulations – although in the inhabitants’ theoretical representation,
these are represented by 2N branches. Of the 4N simulations, almost all (for large N) will contain close to 3N
4
zeroes
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and N
4
ones. These simulations will contain inhabitants who, following Greaves-Myrvold, believe they have confirmed
that the branch weights (in their own theoretical representation, which remember contains only 2N branches) are very
close to (3
4
, 1
4
). They believe too that the weights define an importance measure on the branches: a branch with r
zeroes and (N − r) ones has importance (very close to) (3
4
)r(1
4
)N−r. They thus conclude that their weight assignment
will be confirmed on a set of branches whose total importance is close to 1.
Now, I think I can see how to run some, though not all, of an argument that supports this conclusion. The branch
importance measure defined by inhabitants who find relative frequency 3
4
of zeroes corresponds to the counting measure
on simulations. If we could argue, for instance by appealing to symmetry, that each of the 4N simulations is equally
important, then this branch importance measure would indeed be justified. If we could also argue, perhaps using
some form of anthropic reasoning, that there is an equal chance of finding oneself in any of the 4N simulations, then
the chance of finding oneself in a simulation in which one concludes that the branch weights are (very close to) (3
4
, 1
4
)
would be very close to one. Turning that around, the theory that the branch weights are (3
4
, 1
4
) would then imply
that, with high probability, one should expect to see relative frequency of zeroes close to 3
4
. There would indeed then
to be a sense in which the branch weights define which subsets of the branches are important for theory confirmation.
It seems hard to make this argument rigorous. In particular, the notion of “chance of finding oneself” in a particular
simulation doesn’t seem easy to define properly. Still, we have an arguably natural measure on simulations, the
counting measure, according to which most of the inhabitants will arrive at (close to) the right theory of branch
weights. That might perhaps be progress.
2. The qualia enhancing multiverse
But consider now the qualia enhancing multiverse, again a multiverse with the same type of machine, in which
the branches arise in the way we’ve previously considered, as the result of technologically advanced beings running
simulations. Whenever the red button is pressed in a simulated universe, that universe is deleted, and successor
universes with outcomes 0 and 1 written on the tape are initiated. This time, though, the beings create just one
simulation with outcome 0, and one with outcome 1, but devise their simulations so that the qualia – the mental
sensations – of the inhabitants in the outcome 0 simulation are three times as intense. As before, from the perspective
of the inhabitants, there is no way to detect that outcomes 0 and 1 are being treated differently, and so they represent
them in their theories with one branch each.
There is, again, an arguably natural sense in which they ought – if they were aware of the rules of their multiverse –
to assign to the outcome 0 branch three times the importance of the outcome 1 branch: in other words, they ought to
assign branch weights (3
4
, 1
4
). Recall, pleasure and pain in outcome 0 branches have tripled in intensity. The welfare
of successors on outcome 0 branches is felt more intensely, and in that sense it matters more.
Let me deal here with three possible objections:
(a) It might be argued that qualia enhancement should be analysed differently, as an example of an unannounced
alteration in utility functions: the actual payoff of winning a bet with outcome 0 is three times the expected
payoff, since the inhabitants don’t expect any qualia enhancement. Certainly it could be analysed in this way.
But this reflects an arbitrary choice that always needs to be made in many-worlds theories. (Precisely the same
argument could be made in the case of the replicating multiverse, for example.) The statement that one branch
is N times as important as another can always be recast as a statement that utilities on the first branch are
rescaled by N relative to those on the second. So, we can legitimately analyse qualia enhancement as an effect
altering the relative importance of branches, and it’s interesting to do so, as this lets us test general propositions
about the confirmation of theories attaching importance to branches.
(b) The reader may not believe that there is a sensible account of experience involving qualia, or that intensifying
qualia makes any sense. Never mind. It’s just a useful device to make a point about branch measures. It could
be formulated in another way: we could suppose that the simulators arrange that all bets have payoffs with
three times the expected utility on outcome 0, while erasing the relevant bits of the inhabitants’ memories so
that they’re not aware that the payoff tripled.
(c) One might also worry that inhabitants in an outcome 0 branch would notice that the intensity of their qualia
has just tripled. For the sake of the argument, we must assume not. Insofar as the notion of qualia enhancement
makes sense, this seems reasonable: their memories will triple in intensity along with everything else.
Suppose, once again, that the inhabitants believe that there are unknown weights attached to the branches, and
follow the Greaves-Myrvold procedure for identifying those weights. What happens now? After N runs of the
experiment, there will be 2N simulations – now correctly represented by 2N branches in the inhabitants’ many-worlds
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theory. The simulations will contain inhabitants who, following Greaves-Myrvold, believe they have confirmed that
the branch weights are very close to (p, 1− p), because their observed relative frequency is p = r/N , for each r in the
range 0 ≤ r ≤ N . They believe that the weights define an importance measure on the branches: a branch with r zeroes
and (N − r) ones has importance (very close to) (p)r(1 − p)N−r. They thus conclude that their weight assignment
will be confirmed on a set of branches whose total importance is close to 1. Now, in one sense, the inhabitants
whose observed relative frequency p = 3/4 are a special case. Their inferred importance measure equals the natural
importance measure defined by qualia intensity. And if we weight the branches by this importance measure, it is the
case, by the same calculation as before, that, on a set of branches with total measure close to one, the inhabitants
end up with (very close to) the ”right” branch weights, (3
4
, 1
4
).
But wait! If we count the simulations, the inhabitants who arrive at weights (3
4
, 1
4
) are a tiny minority. Almost
everyone arrives at the wrong branch weights – and, as in our earlier example, almost everyone arrives at a measure
of importance according to which branches with (very close to) their observed relative frequency are the important
ones. By the natural simulation counting measure, theory confirmation has spectacularly failed.
What these last two examples show is that there are two distinct senses, which Greaves-Myrvold and Wallace fail
to separate, in which a branch weight might possibly be said to be a measure of importance. It could be said to be
a ”caring measure”, if there is some reason to care differently about the welfare of successors on different branches.
And it could be said to be, for want of a better term, an ”explanatory counting measure”, if there is some reason to
think that we are likelier to find ourselves on some branches rather than others – or some other argument to show
that a branching theory which predicts the observed relative frequencies (or other data) on a set of branches of high
explanatory counting measure thereby explains them. What we’ve seen is that the first property doesn’t necessarily
imply the second, and it’s the second that is needed for an adequate account of branching theory confirmation.
Couldn’t a many-worlds theorist then simply postulate the existence of an explanatory counting measure? (And
perhaps also postulate that a caring measure exists and equals the explanatory counting measure?)
A preliminary remark: even postulating a caring measure – which has been proposed[22] in the Everettian literature
– already seems a very strange manoeuvre. Physical theories can certainly give reasons for rational agents to perform
certain actions if they have certain goals. But what’s envisaged here is a theory that by fiat imposes a constraint on
rational behaviour. I’m not clear – and at least some Everettians (e.g. [13]) seem to share this worry – that this
makes any sense, either as an idea about physics, or about rationality.[55]
In any case, when it comes to postulating an explanatory counting measure, one should be clear: the proposal is
that a many-worlds theory defines, by fiat, without any attempt at further justification, whose observations matter
and whose may be neglected, when it comes to testing and confirming the theory. The theory defines its own – highly
non-standard – criteria for deciding whether or not it is a scientific success.
One could play this sort of game, of course, even in one world. For example, Alice could define a theory that
includes – as a postulate, with no further explanation – the principle that everyone who agrees with her observations
and her theoretical interpretation is important for theory confirmation, and everyone else is negligible. She could then
announce, after checking with the important people, that her theory is confirmed. This would be self-consistent, and
maybe politically adept, but it wouldn’t be science.
It’s no more scientifically respectable to declare that we can, without further justification, confirm Everettian
quantum theory by neglecting the observations made on selected low Born weight branches. A Pavlovian association
of low Born weight with small probability – illegitimately carried over from one world quantum theory – may perhaps
lend an aura of greater respectability. But in Everettian quantum theory the Born weight is simply a number attached
to branches. It has no intrinsic relevance to theory confirmation, and unless we add further structure to the theory,
we cannot justify assigning it any such role.
Note again the contrast here with the one-world case: one-world probabilists do not pick and choose which obser-
vations are to be used for theory generation or confirmation.
C. Many-worlds confirmation: conclusion
To explain how we could come to confirm Everettian many-worlds quantum theory it is not enough to note that
we have Born weights to hand and so can automatically give them a confirmation-theoretic roˆle. As the decorative
weight multiverse illustrates, branch weights can be simply irrelevant to theory formation and confirmation.
Nor can Wallace’s arguments for treating the Born weights as a caring measure suffice, even if we take Wallace’s
result at face value. As the qualia enhancing multiverse illustrates, a caring measure is not necessarily an explanatory
counting measure.
Thus, the most sympathetic (though unauthorised) translation of Greaves-Myrvold’s account of many-worlds and
confirmation that I can find requires us to add structure that justifies the existence of an explanatory counting
measure. This requires interpreting Everettian quantum theory, along with competing many-worlds theories theories,
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as modelled by versions of the replicating multiverse, with branches constantly being deleted, and successor branches
created. We need to postulate that the number of simulations or realisations of a given branch at a given time is
proportional to the branch weight, and to assume that it is rational to treat all realisations as equally valuable. We
need also to postulate something like an anthropic principle that tells us that, in some sense that needs to be properly
defined, the chance of finding ourselves in one of a given class of realisations at a given time is proportional to the
number of realisations in the class.
This, if it could be made rigorous, would suggest something resembling the objectively determinist “momentary
minds” version of Albert-Loewer’s many-minds interpretation[14–16], in which the minds exist only instantaneously,
with no continuous identity extending over time. This isn’t a picture I find easy to take seriously. As I read them,
none of the Everettian contributors to the present volume would wish to defend this account – and yet it seems very
closely aligned with some of their intuitions. Let me close here by inviting readers to see if they can find a better way
of rigorously justifying Greaves’ gloss:[23]
But since we have a measure over our successors, we can, if we find it intuitive, talk of ’how much
successor’ sees spin-up. I have a preference for my spin-down successor to receive chocolate, rather than
my spin-up successor, because there is more of the former; more of my future lies that way. Thus, I
think, Lockwood’s (1996) talk of a ’superpositional dimension’, and/or Vaidman’s (1998, 2001) suggestion
that we speak of the amplitude-squared measure as a ’measure of existence’, are somewhat appropriate
(although we are not to regard lower-weight successors as less real, for being real is an all-or-nothing affair
– we should say instead that there is less of them).
V. FUZZINESS, RATIONALITY AND DECISION THEORY IN MANY WORLDS
Two of the most interesting recent developments in the Everettian literature, in my view, have been the attempt
to argue for an intrinsically fuzzy emergent quasiclassical ontology[19] and (as already discussed) the attempt to
reinterpret Born weights via a many-worlds version of decision theory[20]. Interesting, but flawed – each project has
deep problems, and they appear to be based on inconsistent premises.
A. Fuzziness and its limitations
Granted, as Wallace[19] notes, viable higher level scientific theories can and do, indeed, supervene on more funda-
mental theories. Objects in those theories need not have any unique and precise definition in terms of fundamental
concepts: there is, indeed, no unique, natural, precise, chemical characterisation of a tiger.
Nonetheless, there is a very strong reason for seeking[45] a precise mathematical formulation of the intuition that
many branching worlds emerge from unitary quantum theory – or else a precise mathematical formulation of some
other structure consistent with Everettian ideas – namely, that it is not at all clear that, without such a formulation, we
have a well-defined scientific theory to discuss. (This, it seems to me, is why both Everettians[8, 11] and critics[15, 16]
have often attempted to find mathematical structures that might explain the notion of branching.) The alternative
strategy, proposed by Wallace[19], of trying to interpret the implications of a fundamentally mathematical theory in
terms of higher level fuzzily defined constructs carries a very obvious danger — namely, a retreat into vagueness and
hand-waving on points where precision really is required. It’s hard to run a serious argument (pro or con), let alone
prove a rigorous theorem, if one doesn’t, in the end, know quite what one’s talking about.
B. Fuzzy minds
A case in point is Wallace’s appeal to functionalist intuitions in trying to give an account of the mind states of
agents in Everettian quantum theory. Readers are, I think, owed a much more precise explanation of what, actually,
is supposed to follow from this, since some rather crucial points appear to turn on unspecified details.
For instance, on this account, do distinct mind states necessarily correspond to orthogonal quantum states? If
so, wouldn’t this account necessarily supply us with a preferred orthogonal decomposition of the unitarily evolving
quantum state? And wouldn’t this, pace Wallace[19], allow a precise definition of a relevant branching structure after
all?
Wallace places great emphasis on the lack of a unique natural definition of a quasiclassical branch, and hence the
impossibility of agents formulating a rational strategy based on counting distinct future branches. But it’s at least
as relevant to examine whether our account of mind states supplies a natural definition of a future self, and whether
16
it might be possible for agents to formulate a rational strategy based on counting distinct future selves? Can’t an
agent identify successor selves as distinct if and only if they have distinct mind states, ascribe to distinct successors a
branching history corresponding to that recorded in their memories, and use those data to define a rational strategy
for taking account of their welfare? (These points are pursued further in appendix A.)
On the other hand, if non-orthogonal quantum states could correspond to distinct mind states, how would we
even begin to connect quantum theory with even the appearance of probabilities? Quantum theory gives no general
rule to calculate a probability of a transition from an unknown state belonging to one fuzzily defined set of states
(corresponding to mind state A) to an unknown state belonging to another (corresponding to mind state B). But
that’s what we’d need to calculate, in principle, in order to obtain a number corresponding to the apparent probability
of arriving at state B when starting in state A. Maybe one could cook up such a rule, and then explain how the Born
rule emerges as an approximation under suitable circumstances – but it’s not obvious how, and this would certainly
be going beyond quantum theory as presently understood.
Both options thus lead to serious, perhaps insuperable, difficulties.
C. Can precise preferences arise in a fuzzy ontology?
Another very basic worry about Wallace’s programme is its equivocation over mathematical rigour. Everything in
Wallace’s ontology that’s relevant to rational decisions — including agents, the quasiclassical branches they inhabit,
the branch states, and the branch Born weights, and the distinction between micro-states and macro-states — is
intrinsically fuzzily defined[19]. There is, on Wallace’s account, no precise fact of the matter about the different
quasiclassical states that would result after a bet on a quantum experiment, nor about the Born weights of the
branches corresponding to those quasiclassical states. And this isn’t merely because quantum theory doesn’t supply a
unique natural definition of elementary branches and branching events: the total Born weight of all the quasiclassical
branches describing a spin-up outcome of a Stern-Gerlach experiment isn’t precisely defined either.
Now, to be sure, the total weight is supposed to be approximately defined. We are supposed, on Wallace’s account,
to be able to say that it’s in a range of the form R = (p − ǫ, p+ ǫ), where ǫ is very small, and p thus represents an
approximate total Born weight.[56] But we’re not supposed to be able, on this account, to reduce ǫ to zero: below
some level of precision, it becomes unavoidably arbitrary, just a matter of taste in your choice of branch definition,
whether you take the total weight as p1 ∈ R or p2 ∈ R.
And yet, Wallace’s decision theoretic programme postulates that each rational agent should have a precisely specified
and complete preference ordering among a very large class of possible unitary maps that produce different possible
future global states. Where could such a preference ordering possibly come from? The ordering is supposed to be
agent-dependent. Physics doesn’t equip rational agents with some personal preference ordering on global states: they
have to arrive at their preferences by introspection and reasoning. If one accepts Wallace’s conclusions, the only
ultimately relevant quantities are branch weights and the agent’s personal utilities for macrostates (whose existence
is supposed to follow given the preference ordering axioms). But even a super-agent who finds they can calculate the
former and can identify the latter by pure introspection would find these quantities only fuzzily defined – so that,
in comparing some pairs (U1, U2) of actions on a given state |ψ〉, however hard they try and however carefully they
analyse the alternatives, they wouldn’t be able to identify a reliable preference, not because the resulting global states
are precisely equivalent, but because their difference is fuzzily ambiguous. On some views, U1|ψ〉 would seem very
slightly preferable; on others, U2|ψ〉 would. In Wallace’s notation [19] for preference orderings, neither U1 ψ U2 nor
U2 ψ U1 would hold in all ways of looking at the situation. Nor does it seem legitimate to postulate that U1 ∼ψ U2
must hold in such cases. One can imagine the possibility of a sequence (U1, . . . , Un) such that no preference can
reliably be identified between Ui|ψ〉 and Ui+1|ψ〉, for i = 1, . . . , (n − 1), but nonetheless setting Ui ∼ψ Ui+1 violates
transitivity, since U1 ≻ψ Un does hold no matter what view the agent adopts of the fuzzy facts.
We are not, in any case, super-agents, and can only read Wallace’s arguments as prescriptions for ideal rationality
rather than descriptions of our real-world behaviour. None of us in fact has a complete and precise preference ordering
among the relevant unitaries. Wallace, in effect, is telling us that we should ideally adjust our reasoning and their
behaviour so as to be consistent with some complete preference ordering. But how? There is no natural algorithm
available: any choice will involve uncountably many arbitrary decisions on pairs of preferences.[44] And why? Given
that no choice of ordering will have any intelligible justification, even after the entire analysis is complete, how can
there be a rational compulsion to make some choice (even if, counterfactually, it were practical)?
Here, it seems to me Wallace’s prescription runs into essentially the same difficulties that he identifies in other ways
of thinking about Everettian branching. One could, in principle, find some (perhaps ad hoc) prescription defining a
branching structure for the unitarily evolving state vector, and one could then use this structure to define a rational
Born-rule-independent strategy based on branch counting. Wallace accepts that such a strategy is not logically
inconsistent, but argues that it is likely to be difficult to implement in practice (because defining a precise branching
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structure is difficult) and hard to justify in principle (because the definition seems to require ad hoc choices). Both
objections apply – arguably with at least equal force – to the Wallace programme.
This also reinforces the point that the case for Wallacean rationality cannot possibly rely on the lack of any practical
alternative strategy. A very practical alternative is to follow whatever combination of instinct and reasoning evolution
provided us before we became aware of Everettian quantum theory. Altering that strategy so as to comply rigorously
with Wallace’s axioms isn’t practical; even coming close to doing so may not be. To be persuaded that we ought to
try, we would need to be rationally persuaded not only that we should ideally be Wallaceans, but also that there is a
practical method which allows us to become closer to being Wallaceans, and that we will be better off if we employ
this method.[57]
In short, given Wallace’s account of a fuzzy ontology, there seems a strong reason to doubt Wallace’s most basic
postulate of rationality, R1, which states that rational agents have a complete (or connected) preference ordering on
the unitary operations available to them at any state |ψ〉. No actual agent in a fuzzy Everettian ontology will ever
be able to arrive at such an ordering in practice. Moreover, even if they had infinite computational power, fixing an
ordering would require making a very complicated ad hoc choice which can have no complete rational justification.
Yet without R1, the purported derivation of the Born rule[20] fails at the first step.
It’s not clear to me that there is any fix for this, but let me comment briefly on two possible responses.
First, one might perhaps try weakening the postulate R1 to suggest that agents have, or should aspire to have,
a preference ordering that approximates a complete ordering, in the hope of then proving that their policy should
approximate Born-weighted mean utilitarianism. One problem with this is that one would need first to find and
justify a suitable definition of approximation applied to preferences between pairs of unitary operations. As these are
unquantified binary relations, it doesn’t seem obvious that any suitable definition exists.
Second, one might consider the desperate resort of postulating a total ordering as part of the physical theory. But
even that surely isn’t available here. The orderings, recall, are agent-dependent, and even the most postulate-happy
Everettian would surely recoil from requiring that fundamental physical laws specify independently, agent by agent,
the preferences of every agent instantiated in nature.
Trying to formulate a rigorous decision theory for preferences in a fuzzy ontology may thus be rather like trying to
build a skyscraper on mud.
D. Circularity of the Wallace programme?
Zurek[26] flags another worry about the logical relation between the two parts[19, 20] of Wallace’s programme,
namely an apparent circularity. Wallace envisages a fuzzy quasiclassical ontology arising as the result of mathematical
regularities observable within components of the unitarily evolving universal wave function. These regularities are
supposed, in a realistic cosmological model, to arise through the decoherence of classical variables and to be defined
by what Gell-Mann and Hartle term a quasiclassical domain [25], in which, for example, operators approximately
quantifying local mass densities approximately follow classical equations of motion with probability close to one.
Here the probability for a history defined by a sequence of operators P1(t1), . . . , Pn(tn) is given by the decoherence
functional
Tr(Pn(tn) . . . P1(t1)ρinitialP1(t1) . . . Pn(tn)) . (3)
In other words, the ontology is defined by applying the Born rule. Even if one could show, as Wallace claims, that
agents defined within that ontology are rationally justified in using the Born rule as a calculus for decisions, it would
seem incorrect to portray this argument as a derivation of the Born rule within Everettian quantum theory. Wallace’s
argument should rather be understood as attempting to show something weaker: that the Born rule re-emerges as
output (albeit, to be fair, in an interesting and non-obvious way) if assumed as input. Even if correct, this would leave
open the possibility that there are many different consistent and essentially inequivalent ways of defining ontologies
that include distinct types of agents for whom different rational decision calculi can be established. It would thus fail
to explain whether and (if so) why our own decision calculus should be based on the Born rule. It would also leave
open the questions as to whether and (if so) how agents in some consistently defined Everettian ontology can arrive
at the rational decision calculus appropriate to their ontology.
E. Problems with Born-weighted mean utilitarianism
Wallace[20], developing earlier ideas of Deutsch[12], partly in response to criticisms (e.g. Ref. [37]) of the latter,
then goes on to argue that from a few simple and purportedly natural axioms we can prove that rational agents who
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believe themselves to be in a universe described by many-worlds quantum theory are rationally required to (a) have a
utility function that quantifies the value they assign to possible future quasiclassical events, (b) act so as to maximise
their Born-weighted mean utility.
As we just saw, Wallace’s first postulate, R1, seems to run into a fundamental obstacle, since neither Born weights
nor quasiclassical histories (and thus their utility) are precisely defined in his ontology, and without R1 the decision
theoretic argument, which, inter alia, implies the existence of a utility function, fails. Moreover, even for an agent
who has a utility function applicable to all relevant quasiclassical histories, the strategy of maximising Born-weighted
mean utility is not well-defined. For a real world agent in state ψ there will generally be available unitaries U1 and U2
for which it’s a matter of arbitrary definitional choice whether U1 or U2 produces higher Born-weighted mean utility.
There’s a further practical problem, which isn’t apparent in simple models of many-worlds experiments but is a
serious worry in realistic applications. To be a rigorous Born-weight mean utilitarian in the real world, one must allow
for the possibility of small Born weight branches with extreme negative or positive utility. The mean Born-weighted
utility of a bet that, with Born weight close to 1, involves small utility gains or losses, is radically altered if it also
creates a 10−25 Born weight branch of utility −1030. Now, the Deutsch-Wallace-Savage arguments imply no bounds
on agents’ utility functions. It seems unlikely that any a priori argument can supply one, since pure rationality
imposes no bound on utility functions – and in practice, for example, there seems to be no generally agreed lower
bound on the utility cost assigned to the destruction of the Earth or similar catastrophes[38]. A rigorous real world
Born-weight mean utility calculation thus typically requires very careful analysis of small weight branches. In fact,
even ensuring that the sum defining the mean utility converges requires careful analysis of small weight branches:
consider, for example, the possibility of a set of branches of weight 2−n and utility −3n for all integers n ≥ N .
Practically speaking, the best that real world agents are likely to be able to do is first simplify their model, by
excluding events below some weight threshold, and then estimate a Born-weighted mean utility within that model —
with no assurance that the estimated mean utility is close to the true mean utility (if indeed the latter exists).[58]
This needs emphasising, since much of Wallace’s case against alternative rational strategies is based on the claim that
they are ill-defined or impractical or both. Actually, as we will see, alternative strategies can sometimes be rather
better defined and more practical than Born-weight mean utilitarianism.
F. Everettian many-worlds rationality reconsidered
1. General remarks on life in a multiverse
It seems prima facie surprising to claim that mathematical analysis could show that Born-weight mean utilitari-
anism, or any other strategy, is the unique rational way of optimizing the welfare of one’s own, and other people’s,
many future selves in a multiverse. After all, human parents are faced with the not entirely disanalogous question
of how to take into account the welfare of their genetic descendants in (most of us assume) a single world, and it’s a
notoriously complex problem. People generally care not only about their descendants’ present welfare, but also about
their expected future welfare after our death. They can, and sometimes do, frame guiding rules of thumb to arbitrate
between competing claims on their resources – for instance, to divide their estate equally among their children, or to
divide it according to their need. They take into account their children’s relationships with one another, with others,
and with society. They tend to care about immediate descendants more than distant ones, in a way that generally
follows no well-defined formula. Evolutionarily developed instincts also impel a more general concern for our genes
and those of the species. This concern probably cannot be precisely codified, but we can often find principles with
which they are roughly aligned and which roughly characterise the behaviour they motivate. For instance, some
species’ instinctive behaviour might be roughly modelled as aiming to maximise an individual’s expected number of
descendants after 102 years. Some humanists’ aims might be modelled as aiming to maximise the survival probability
of the human race (and its genetic successors) over the next 109 years.
Some of these principles require impossible calculations to implement precisely, but can nonetheless legitimately be
regarded as rational aims. If we adopt them, we commit ourselves to trying to satisfy them as best we can. In general,
they imply conflicting courses of action. No one, I think, would seriously claim that any one of them is uniquely
rationally preferable to all the others. We just make decisions as best we can, imperfectly guided by logic, sometimes
perhaps trying our best to optimise quantities we know we cannot properly calculate. And we always did: before we
were capable of rational reflection, evolution equipped us to muddle through, sometimes following one rule of thumb,
sometimes another. That’s life. Why should we expect evolution or rationality to have equipped us any better when
faced with the bewilderingly underdetermined imperative to care about our and everyone else’s quantum descendants
in a hypothetical multiverse?
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2. Alternative Born-weight-sensitive strategies
Suppose, for the sake of the discussion, that we can somehow ignore the fuzziness of the ontology. Suppose that we
have an agent faced with a finite number of choices j, each of which will create quasiclassical branches (although not
a unique quasiclassical branching structure) with well-defined utilities U ji , in such a way that the set S
j
i of branches
with the same utility U ji has a well-defined total Born weight p
j
i , and that the sums µ
j =
∑
i p
j
iU
j
i are finite.[59]
Consider again some of the strategies listed in Sec. III B. The x-percentile utilitarian, for 0 < x < 100, always
has a well-defined strategy, as does the future self democrat. The future self elitist and Price-Rawlsian’s strategies
are defined provided that maxj supi(U
j
i ) and maxj infi(U
j
i ), respectively, are defined. These will always hold true
if the indexing set I ∋ i is finite. They need not hold true if the branch utilities are unbounded above or below
(possibilities which are not usually considered by Everettians, and which perhaps might be excluded by assumption,
but possibilities nonetheless).
As a practical matter, unless low Born weight extreme utility branches can be excluded, the future self elitist and
Price-Rawlsian may have difficulty optimising their strategies, even if an optimal strategy exists, since calculating
supi(U
j
i ) or infi(U
j
i ) requires analysing low Born weight branches that realise, or converge towards, the extreme utility
values. This is also be a problem – which may be easier or harder, depending on the details – for the mean utilitarian.
Generically, it should not be a significant problem for the x-percentile utilitarian (for most x, say 1 < x < 99),
assuming the utility function is generically well-behaved over the range, since the utility at the x-th percentile is then
relatively insensitive to small perturbations of x, and so the calculation is relatively insensitive to the details of low
Born weight extreme utility branches. It should also generally not be a problem for a purely self-concerned future
self democrat, who would generally hope to be able to attain a majority decision without counting the votes from low
Born weight extreme utility branches.[60]
3. Some other strategies
The Gell-Mann–Hartle aesthete fixes a particularly pretty quasiclassical consistent set S, which she uses to define
a way of counting branches containing her future selves.[61] Her quantum ontology is Everettian: she agrees that her
selected set has no fundamental physical significance. However, she thinks one needs some way of weighting future
selves and that this one is as rationally defensible as Born-rule-weighting or any other, and more aesthetically pleasing.
The value teleologist fixes a particular cosmological final density matrix ρf , whose spectrum does not include zero.
In considering whether or not to accept a generalized bet on a quantum experiment, or indeed making any decision
dependent on a quantum event, he uses pre- and post-selection, with some standard theory of the initial cosmological
conditions defining the initial state ρi, and with ρf defning the final state, in order to calculate the probabilities of the
future worlds corresponding to the possible outcomes.[46, 47] He bets as if these were the actual probabilities. This
is not because he believes they are – he believes in deterministic unitary quantum mechanics and so doesn’t think
probabilities are fundamental, and in any case his physical theory is a standard cosmological theory with initial state
ρi and no post-selection on ρf . However, for aesthetic or existential reasons, his interest in future events is conditional
on the chosen final state post-selection.
4. Wallace’s rationality postulates
We noted already that branch weight, branch macrostate, branch microstate, and reward are all only fuzzily defined
in Wallace’s ontology[19], and that this gives strong reason to doubt Wallace’s ordering axiom R1. It casts doubt too
on whether the availability axioms A3−A5 and the rationality axioms R3, R5 even have a precise definition.
Wallace’s diachronic consistency axiom, R2, is violated by the x-percentile utilitarian strategy, among others. Now,
to be fair, one can find examples where the two conflict which illustrate some motivation for diachronic consistency.
Consider the possibility of being offered N dollars per unit time to stand in a radiation field, with a risk p of lethality
per unit time. An x-percentile utilitarian who considers this offer will generally find their response depends on the
timescale over which they regard their decisions as binding: it could seem a good offer considered as valid for the next
second, and then good again for each successive second, but a bad offer if they have to make a single decision about
whether to accept for the next hour.
Yet, even in this rather unusual example, the motivation for x-percentile utilitarians is still clear when x is close to 0
or 100, and their actual strategy is intended as a practical approximation to their ideal strategy of Price-Rawlsianism
or future self elitism. The Price-Rawlsian will decline unless the total risk is zero; the future self elitist will accept
unless the survival probability is zero. Note too that even here x-percentile utilitarianism is a well-defined strategy
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once a timescale for decisions is fixed. In the more normal circumstance of separated discrete decisions, x-percentile
utilitarianism seems both rationally defensible and practical, which suggests that the diachronic consistency axiom is
less rationally compelling than Wallace argues.
Another reason to doubt R2, it seems to me, is that, pace Wallace’s comment[20] –
“In the presence of widespread, generic violation of diachronic consistency, agency in the Everett
universe is not possible at all.”
– diachronic consistency actually is, strictly speaking, generically violated in real world decisions. A Savagean or
Wallacean rational agent, recall, has to be equipped with a utility function as well as a probability measure for
outcomes. Rationality is silent on the precise form of the utility function. If we have one, it reflects our current
values. These generally change over time, as we do, partly as a result of decisions we have previously taken, whose
outcomes affect us in ways we cannot reliably predict beforehand: our own natures are too complex and too opaque
to us, and we also change in response to our environment, which is also complex and unpredictable. The best it
seems to me that one might hope to say of diachronic consistency in real world decisions is that pretty often, in the
short term, it approximately holds — which clearly isn’t a strong enough assumption to prove an interesting decision
theoretic representation theorem.
Elga’s proposal that Everettians might have a rational preference for future self diversity[39] also seems pertinent
here, as does the case for rationally preferring future society diversity. (Why not exploit the scope for political
compromise by causing society to evolve in different ways along different branches?) In both cases, it seems to me,
contra Wallace[39], diachronic consistency can be rationally violated. I can consistently believe now that it’s a good
thing that the global state should include future copies of me as a king and a beggar, while knowing that, if I ever
find myself a beggar, I would strive to become a king if I could.[62] From the perspective of my future beggar self,
the unpleasantness of finding that he is the beggar outweighs the satisfaction of knowing that diversity was achieved.
From my present perspective, the prospect of diversity nonetheless remains appealing.
As Wallace himself notes earlier in his discussion[40]:
. . . to make a copy of myself and send him off to do a dangerous or disagreeable task – and . . . to take
actions designed to prevent him shirking that task . . . is not irrational.
Indeed – and this remains true if the task, for which I have a strong present desire, is to ensure future self diversity.
The fact that my future selves will never interact makes no difference to the rational justification.
Turning briefly to other postulates:
(R3) Microstate indifference, R3, can be violated by value teleologist strategies, among others.
(R4) Continuity, R4, is violated by x-percentile utilitarian strategies, among others.[63]
(R5) Branching indifference, R5, is violated by Gell-Mann–Hartle aesthete strategies, among others.
5. Summary
Wallace argues that strategies other than mean utilitarianism turn out, on closer inspection, either to be not
rigorously defined, completely impractical, or to violate criteria such as diachronic consistency that allegedly define
the very essence of rationality. The last two claims — impracticality and violation of rational essentials – surely
require mathematical underpinning and justification, if they are to have any possible relevance to what is presented
as a rigorous mathematical argument. For example, an account of practicality needs some complexity criteria for
rational agent computations: one could then at least discuss the empirical justification for the proposed criteria and
whether and when they actually distinguish mean utilitarianism from other strategies. Similarly, if one accepts that
diachronic consistency is generically violated and sometimes grossly violated in the real world, an account of its
role in decisions needs to quantify and compare the degree of violation implied by different strategies in different
circumstances. At present, though, the arguments for diachronic consistency and those concerning practicality rest
only on very debatable verbal intuitions.
As for lack of rigorous definition, there seems to be a danger of a double standard, whereby the fuzziness of the
ontology is used to point out difficulties for alternative strategies (though in fact it also causes difficulties for mean
utilitarianism), while the arguments for mean utilitarianism are justified in the context of toy models in which a precise
definition of a branching structure can be found (in which case many strategies other than mean utilitarianism can
be precisely defined). The case has not been made that mean utilitarianism is well-defined or practical in Wallace’s
fuzzy Everettian ontology, in which the mean utility of a strategy can at best only be fuzzily defined. One can imagine
examples in which it either fails to be finite or is impractical to estimate – and it seems hard to exclude the possibility
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that these features often apply in the real world. One can also easily construct examples in which other strategies are
easier either to approximate or to implement precisely.
Wallace’s rationality postulates, likewise, are hard to motivate in Wallace’s fuzzy Everettian ontology, where they
are ultimately intended to apply, but where they are difficult, perhaps impossible, to define precisely. They generally
appear, in any case, possible but uncompelling guides for rational agents. Where defined and practical, mean utilitar-
ianism is certainly a rationally defensible strategy, with some mathematically convenient properties. But, like other
critics[34, 35], I am far from persuaded that, if I were an Everettian, I should or would be a Born-weighted mean
utilitarian.
VI. AGAINST SUBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY
One of the stranger claims in the recent Everettian literature is the suggestion, first made by Saunders [13, 48–50],
that Everettian quantum theory, although deterministic, nonetheless has a natural probabilistic interpretation that
can be found not by amending the theory or by adding further postulates, but simply by – somehow – analysing the
experience and linguistic usages of agents, that is, creatures like ourselves, in an Everettian universe. In support of
this claim are offered highly technical and controversial arguments concerning the philosophy of language. It seems
to me simply a mistake, an exercise in wish fulfilment, to think that anything of significance to fundamental physics
could turn on such questions, as though waving the magic wand of linguistic philosophy over a unitarily evolving state
vector could somehow conjure up a probability measure and a sample space.[64]
Consider Wallace’s succinct summary[50] of the argument:
“[The argument for subjective uncertainty] may be summarised as follows: in ordinary, non-branching
situations, the fact that I expect to become my future self supervenes on the fact that my future self has
the right causal and structural relations to my current self so as to count as my future self. What, then,
should I expect when I have two or more such future selves? There are only three possibilities:
1. I should expect abnormality: some experience which is unlike normal human experience (for instance,
I might expect somehow to become both future selves).
2. I should expect to become one or the other future self.
3. I should expect nothing: that is, oblivion.
Of these, (3) seems absurd: the existence of either future self would guarantee my future existence, so
how can the existence of more such selves be treated as death? (1) is at least coherent – we could imagine
some telepathic link between the two selves. However, on any remotely materialist account of the mind
this link will have to supervene on some physical interaction between the two copies – an interaction which
is not in fact present. This leaves (2) as the only option, and in the absence of some strong criterion as
to which copy to regard as “really” me, I will have to treat the question of which future self I become as
(subjectively) indeterministic.”
This is a false trichotomy. Consider an (obviously simplified) Everettian description of an experiment in which an
agent Alice, initially in brain state |0〉A, observes a system in a quantum superposition
∑2
i=1 ci|i〉S , where |1〉S and|2〉S correspond, say, to the up and down states of a spin 1/2 particle, and becomes entangled:
|0〉A
2∑
i=1
ci|i〉S →
2∑
i=1
ci|i〉A|i〉S . (4)
Here |i〉A is Alice’s brain state after observing the system in state i, for i = 1, 2.
Now, as an aside, we actually should take possibility (3) seriously, for two reasons. First, our conclusions ought to
be based on empirical evidence rather than prejudice. We do not know that Everettian quantum theory is actually
correct; we do not have a good theory of how consciousness is attached to quantum states; we do not know that we
or any other agents have ever been in a superposition of macroscopically distinct brain states. We thus do not know
whether, if we were able to place an agent in such a superposition, they would experience anything — nor, if so, what.
Second, there’s a coherent view of Everettian quantum theory in which we are continually being replaced by multiple
copies of future selves. On this view, even if we assume that superposed selves have individual experiences, we will
experience nothing in future (though our various future selves will).
The more immediately pertinent point, though, is that if we do take Everettian quantum theory seriously, it says,
indeed, that Alice becomes entangled in a macroscopic superposition. A coherent way of describing this, which
respects the link between brain states and mind states, is that just as materially she becomes several future selves, her
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mind becomes several disjoint, non-interacting future minds, with no telepathic link: i.e. option (1) without Wallace’s
misleading gloss.
The one description that seems obviously wrong, given the rules of the game Wallace sets out, is option (2): this
really is an account of mind that supervenes on something not present in the physics, namely a probabilistic evolution
law taking brain state |0〉A to one of the states |i〉A.
The dangers of attaching some fuzzy theory of experience to Everettian quantum theory provoke two comments:
First, the fact that we don’t have a good theory of mind, even in classical physics, doesn’t give us a free pass to
conclude anything we please. That way lies scientific ruin: any physical theory is consistent with any observations if
we can bridge any discrepancy by tacking on arbitrary assumptions about the link between mind states and physics.
We should, rather, be all the more cautious and tentative in offering any conclusion.
Second, the fact that at present no theory of mind can be expressed purely mathematically doesn’t remove the
obligation to strive to express one’s ideas in mathematics as far as possible. Adorning Everettian quantum theory
with extra assumptions expressed in words – for instance, as arguments in linguistic philosophy – without equations
doesn’t alter the fact that one’s making extra assumptions: it merely makes them more vaguely expressed.
Consider[65] Saunders’ exposition[13]:
Consider a simple example. Alice, we suppose, is about to perform a Stern-Gerlach experiment; she
understands the structure of the apparatus and the state preparation device, and she is convinced EQM is
true. In what sense does she learn, post-branching, something new? The answer is that each Alice, post-
branching, learns something new (or is in a position to learn something new) – each will say something
(namely, “I know the outcome is spin-up (respectively, spin-down), and not spin-down (respectively, spin-
up)”) that Alice prior to branching cannot say. It is true that Alice, prior to branching, knows that this
is what each successor will say – but still she herself cannot speak in this way. The implication of this line
of thought is that, appearances notwithstanding, prior to branching Alice does not know everything there
is to know. What is it she does not know? I say “appearances notwithstanding” for of course in one sense
(we may suppose) Alice does know everything there is to know: she knows (we might as well assume) the
entire corpus of impersonal, scientific knowledge. But what that does not tell her is just which person she
is – or where she is located – in the wave-function of the universe.
But equation (4) suggests there is no meaning to this question before the experiment.[66] Nothing in the mathematics
corresponds to “Alice, who will see spin up” or “Alice, who will see spin down”. On the left we have “Alice, before the
experiment”; on the right we have “Alice, who has seen spin up” and “Alice, who has seen spin down”. If one wants
to postulate an “Alice, who will see spin up”, well, one can – but one should then include her in the mathematics.
One could, for instance, start with a postulate of the form:
“(P) the probability that A’s mind ends up believing that spin is up is |c0|2 and the probability that
A’s mind ends up believing that spin is down is |c1|2.”
This – Albert and Loewer’s “single mind view” [16] – gives only one sentient future Alice. To introduce a collection
of present Alices who in future will experience each of the different possible experimental outcome, one could, instead,
follow Albert and Loewer in postulating a continuum of Alice minds of which a proportion |c0|2 will see spin up.
One could, in short, adopt the many-minds interpretation. I am not persuaded that there is a legitimate alternative
formulation of Saunders’ account.
Appendix A: Further comments on counting descendants
Wallace places great stress on the fact that there is no unique natural definition of a quasiclassical branch in an
Everett universe, and so no way of counting the number of branches with any given feature. For example, a naive
analysis of a quantum experiment with three possible outcomes might suggest that a single branch, pre-experiment,
divides into three, post-experiment. But this, Wallace stresses, neglects the fact that quantum interactions take
place very frequently in time and densely in space, outside our control. A careful attempt to quantify quasiclassical
branches would show many branches splitting into many more during the lifetime of the experiment; however, there
is no unique natural definition that would allow us to pin these numbers down. Hence, it is argued, there is no way
of implementing the naive idea of using branch counts to define a rational strategy – an approach which would, if it
worked, be a coherent alternative to the Born-rule-dependent strategy, and so refute the claim that the latter is the
unique rational strategy.
There is indeed no known natural way of characterising and counting branches. It is worth reconsidering, however,
whether there may nonetheless be a natural way for an agent about to observe an experiment to characterise and
hence count his descendants, by considering their memory states after the experiment.
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Consider first a simple model of an observer, apparatus and quantum state which evolve unitarily during an
experiment so that
|O0 > |A0 > |Q0 >→
3∑
j=1
aj |Oj > |Aj > |Qj > , (A1)
where the first state is at time 0 and the second at time t, the state |Aj > is the apparatus state registering outcome
j and |Oj > is the observer state having observed the apparatus registering outcome j. The agent in state |O0 >
can reasonably say that he will have three successors |Oj > at time t, corresponding to his three future distinct brain
states.
Now consider a more detailed model in which we include an environment, and suppose that
|O0 > |A0 > |Q0 > |E0 >→
3∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
aij |Oj > |Aij > |Qj > |Eij > . (A2)
Again, the sum over j represents the three possible observer states. The sums over i represent decompositions
into orthogonal quasiclassical branches, and the number of terms nj in each sum depends on an arbitrary choice of
definition of quasiclassical branch from among many possible definitions. Since this is supposed to be a model of the
same experiment, we have that
∑
i |aij |2 = |aj |2 for j = 1, 2, 3. The agent in state |O0 > has no unique natural way of
characterising the branches. However, he could consistently view each of the three components, containing the state
|Oj >, j = 1, 2, 3, as representing precisely one successor.[67] After all, he is interested in his successors’ welfare, and
this is determined by their mind states; at this point in the analysis, at least, it is not affected by the state of the rest
of the universe.
It might be objected that we still have not taken sufficiently into account the pervasiveness of environment-induced
quantum interactions, which will presumably also be taking place within the agent’s brain during the experiment.
A more detailed model still would replace the sums on the right hand side of (A2) by sums including at least small
components of a variety of different agent mind states, corresponding to different brain states that arise through
zapping by stray cosmic rays and other quantum effects.
A related objection is that this way of counting successors leads to ambiguities when sequences of experiments are
carried out. Suppose that the agent will carry out a second experiment, with two possible outcomes, if he observes
outcome 1 in the first experiment, but not otherwise. After the first experiment but before the second, it appears
that he has three successors, whose welfare he should value equally. After the second experiment, it appears that
he has four successors, whose welfare he should again value equally. But since two of these descend from one of the
original successors, and each “inherit” any resources he “bequeaths” to that successor, the two ways of counting lead
to different allocation strategies – i.e. they disagree on which “bets” he should be willing to accept on the experiment.
To these objections, however, the agent could make several responses.
First, that his policy is not incoherent, but merely so far incompletely specified. In the case of the two experiments,
he does care equally about the welfare of his three successors between the experiments, and he also cares equally
about the welfare of his four successors after the experiments. To formulate a more precise policy, he would need
to set out some way of trading off the welfares of different successors at different times: for example, by summing
the time-integrated welfares over each distinct life-time segment. That this may become complicated doesn’t imply
that the aim is not rational. Indeed, we face very similar problems in worrying about the well-being of our genetic
descendants. It is perfectly rational to value the welfare of all of your children equally, and also perfectly rational to
value the welfare of all of your as yet unborn grandchildren equally, in both cases ceteris paribus. However, finding
a rational asset allocation policy that respects both these preferences may require some further policy decisions,
complicated calculations and predictions of uncertain future events.
Second, that he would indeed take into account the welfare of all his successors, including those whose mind states
differ because of environmentally induced interactions, if he could. Here again, he can maintain that he has a rational
policy in principle, albeit one that he cannot fully implement it in practice because of the impracticality of carrying
out the relevant calculations. And again, he can say that the latter caveat does not detract from the rationality of
his goal.
Third, that a consistent strategy for weighting his concern for the welfare of successors could be defined by consid-
ering the branching structure recorded in their own memory states. In the example above, successors who experience
two experiments in succession remember that fact, and this distinguishes them from successors who experience only
one experiment. It’s logically consistent – and not obviously any more absurd than any Born-weight-dependent
many-worlds strategy – to assign the former caring weight 1/6 and the latter caring weight 1/3.
To these responses, Everettians might in turn object that there is no natural way, even in principle, of characterising
and counting all the possible mind states of successors of an agent exposed to real-world environmental interactions.
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But if the Everettian case eventually turns on this point, then the objection to rational strategies based on counting
successors ultimately arises from an intrinsic vagueness in the quasifunctionalist theory of mind attached to the
quantum formalism by Wallace et al., not, as claimed, from the vagueness in the notion of a quasiclassical branch. It
seems a most uncomfortable defence of a purportedly fundamental theory to say that it is not well enough developed
for us to be able to assess whether or not one of the key arguments advanced in its favour is valid.
Appendix B: Further Comment on physical laws of rational compulsion
What could it possibly mean to believe that the laws of physics per se rationally compel a particular behaviour
for rational agents in a branching multiverse? The idea here, to be clear, is not merely the truism that the laws of
physics imply significant facts about the world which rational agents might, or even must, sensibly take into account.
It is that there are basic postulates, on an equal footing with other physical laws, that state by fiat that a particular
type of behaviour is rationally compulsory for rational agents. I don’t think I know what this can mean – the idea
of such a law isn’t consistent with my understanding of either physics or rationality – but the idea is definitely in
play in some discussions of many-worlds theories in this volume. Papineau[22] proposes an axiom of this type, and
Greaves-Myrvold[24] consider how to (purportedly) confirm theories including such axioms. My impression is that
many Everettians share Greaves’ view[23] that resorting to such a postulate would be, at least, an adequate fall-back
should Wallace’s[20] and other arguments not hold up.
Here’s a point that seems not to have been considered in the Everettian literature. If we were to take seriously
the idea that physical axioms can rationally compel rational beings to act in a certain way – by fiat, without further
justification – then we must also take seriously the possibility that these rationally compelling axioms can take
unfamiliar forms. For instance, in our branching universe, there’s no reason to restrict to axioms that require rational
preferences to be given by the ordering of values of expressions of the form
∑
i piUi, where Ui is the agent’s utility for
the outcome on branch i and the pi are positive branch weights satisfying the Kolmogorov axioms. There’s nothing
logically inconsistent about postulating laws with negative or complex pi, or preference orderings given by general
joint functions f(pi, Ui), or indeed any other mathematical structure one cares to dream up.[68]
Such laws would generally violate Savage’s axioms and perhaps other cherished intuitions about rational behaviour.
But once one enters the strange game of postulating physical laws defining rational behaviour in multiverses, one
needn’t restrict one’s postulates to intuitions developed in an attempt to provide a foundation for decision theory in a
single chancy universe. Everettians who miss this point seem to me like hypothetical seventeenth century theorists who
learn Hooke’s law, come up with the idea that one can postulate abstract physical force laws that define forces between
objects unmediated by springs, but then still maintain that these laws necessarily have to set force proportional to
separation. Their boldness is inconsistently selective: an abstract law need not be constrained by the details of the
concrete model that inspired it.
Of course, Everettians who think it makes sense to postulate laws of rational compulsion still have the option of
basing their postulates on one-world probability theory, and specifically on optimising Born-rule-weighted average
utility. But one needs to be clear that, prima facie, this is an arbitrary choice from a very large range of possibilities.
Along with everything else in this peculiar game, that choice seems to lack justification. Moreover, as the above
analysis of Greaves-Myrvold’s account of confirmation applied to the weightless universe shows, allowing arbitrary
choices of laws of rational compulsion means not only that many mutually inconsistent choices can be postulated in
the same multiverse but also that each of them can be, by their own lights, confirmed.
Appendix C: A possible empirical distinction between many-worlds and one-world quantum theory
Finally, suppose, notwithstanding all the arguments above, that we arrive at an Everettian theory that, while
perhaps ad hoc and unattractive, is coherent – for example, some version of the many-minds interpretation[16]. It is
generally believed that, without very advanced technology which allows the re-interference of macroscopically distinct
branches, such a theory will necessarily be empirically indistinguishable from Copenhagen quantum theory.
The following argument against this conclusion relies on anthropic reasoning and also on the hypothesis that species
may evolve a consistent preference for or against higher population expectation over higher survival probability. An-
thropic reasoning is notoriously tricky to justify, and we may anyway not necessarily have evolved demonstrable
consistent preferences one way or the other, so the argument may not necessarily have practical application. Nonethe-
less, it does show in principle that evolutionary evidence could make many-worlds theories more or less plausible.
Consider a simple model of two species A and B, both of which begin with population P and are offered, each
year, the option of doing something that depends on a quantum event and carries a 0.5 probability of extinction and
a 0.5 probability of trebling the species population. Suppose that, if they reject the option, their population remains
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constant, as it does in between these decisions. Species A is risk-averse, and so always declines the option. Species B
is risk-tolerant, and instinctively driven to maximise expected population, and so always accepts.
Now let N be a large integer. After N years, if one-world quantum theory is correct, species A will have population
P , and species B will have either population 0 (with probability (1−(1
2
)N )) or population 3N (with probability (1
2
)N ).
In other words, species B will almost surely be extinct. If these are the only two species, and you are alive in the
N -th year, almost certainly you belong to species A.
If many-worlds quantum theory is correct, species A still has population P in all branches. Species B has population
0 in branches of total Born weight (1 − (1
2
)N ), and population 3N in branches of total Born weight (1
2
)N . Now, if
anthropic reasoning is justifiable here, and you are alive in the N -th year, almost certainly you belong to species B.
(There are (3
2
)N times as many minds belonging to species B as to A after N years.)
In other words, there is a sense in which long-run evolutionary success is defined by different measures in one-world
and many-worlds quantum theory. If anthropic reasoning were justifiable, then one could in principle infer whether
one-world or many-worlds quantum theory is likelier correct by seeing whether one belongs to a Born-weighted
expected population maximising species or to a risk-averse species that seeks to maximise its Born-weighted survival
probability. Readers may thus wish to consider whether their species has evolved a coherent strategy of either type.[69]
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